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UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL:
KING COLGATE IS DEAD!
I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to being the golden anniversary of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, the turbulent year 1968 marked the 50th birthday of U.S. v. Col-
gate & Co." and its doctrine of "unilateral refusal to deal." Perhaps it is
appropriate that 1968 was also the year of decision for Albrecht v. The
Herald Co.' and F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc.,3 for these two cases have sounded
the death toll for the ailing Colgate doctrine.
This writing will trace the birth of Colgate, study its steady erosion
through to the recent Park, Davis4 decision and will then consider the
cases subsequent to Park, Davis which, in the author's opinion, spell the
eventual demise for any meaningful application of the doctrine. In large
part this survey shall be limited to Supreme Court decisions, although
consideration will be given to several post-Parke, Davis cases in the
lower courts.5
II. ROUND ONE
To place Colgate in its proper setting, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co.6 must be introduced. Dr. Miles executed written con-
tracts with all of its jobbers and wholesalers. The contracts established a
consignment method of distribution and required each distributor to sell
only to designated druggists at prices established by Dr. Miles. When
Dr. Miles sued to enforce this contract against Park & Sons, a price-cut-
ting distributor, the Supreme Court found the consignment provision to
be a sham, and the price-fixing provision to be void as an unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus the
requested injunction did not issue against Park & Sons.
In Colgate, the government alleged that Colgate's price maintenance
program was established and enforced by the following means: (1) let-
1250 U.S. 300 (1918).
2390 U.S. 145 (1968).
3393 U.S. 223 (1968).
4 U.S. v. Park, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
5 There is no dearth of writing on the subject of unilateral refusal to deal. Some of the
leading articles include: Fulda, Individual Refusals To Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct
Become Vertical Restraint? 30 LAW & CoNTEip. PROB. 590 (1965); Potvin, Choosing
and Dropping Distributors 26 A.B.A. ANTrrRUST SECnoN 99 (1964); Turner, The Definition
of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious Parellelism and Refusals To Deal 75 HARV.
L REV. 655 (1962); Comment, 42 N.Y.U L. Rlv. 947 (1967). For an excellent discussion
of the way Great Britain has approached the problem, see, Harding, Refusal To Sell As A
Method Of Enforcing Resale Price Maintenance - British Experience and Legislative Restric-
tion 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 719 (1967).
6 220 U.S. 373 (1910).
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ters, circulars and lists were distributed displaying the uniform prices to
be charged and stating that any non-complying dealer would be cut-off,
(2) requests, often complied with, were made of dealers to report price-
cutters, (3) investigations were made and violators were placed on sus-
pension lists, (4) offending dealers were asked for assurances of their
future compliance and (5) those dealers who promised to observe the
pricing policy were retained, while those who refused were cut-off. The
Court's first task was to avoid Dr. Miles:
[T]he indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its
products to dealers under agreement which obligated the latter not to
resell except at prices fixed by the company.7
Dr. Miles had forbade resale price maintenance by express contract; no
such contract was involved here. The complaint had alleged a combina-
tion but the district court held that the facts did not prove the allegation.
The Supreme Court considered itself bound by this finding of the lower
court. Without a contract, combination or conspiracy, Section 1 of Sher-
man cannot be violated, so the Court concluded:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.8
The most obvious defect in the Colgate opinion is that the facts dearly
showed that the company had entered express contracts with its dealers to
maintain prices. A more serious and lasting fault is that even if there was
no express, nor even an implied agreement, a combination had been en-
tered into by Colgate and its dealers. The Court seemed to require proof
of an agreement before it could find a combination. But if price-fixing
by contract is an evil, it makes no sense to permit the same to be achieved
through coercion of dealers. Agreement should not be required to estab-
lish an unlawful combination.
III. ROUND Two
The smell of death surrounded Colgate within a year of its birth. In
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.9 the Court had the occasion to in-
terpret its earlier decision. Schrader's caused all of its jobbers to sign
contracts to resell at prices set by the company. It refused to sell to any
jobber who failed to sign or observe the contract. The government con-
tended that Schrader's had entered into a conspiracy or combination with
7 250 U.S. at 307.
81d.
9 252 U.S. 85 (1919).
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its jobbers to fix prices, but the district court dismissed the suit on the
basis of Colgate. In reversing the Supreme Court stated:
The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the opinion
and judgment in that cause [i.e., in Colgate] .... Under the interpreta-
tion adopted by the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indict-
ment failed to charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either
express or implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe speci-
fied resale prices ... 10
In Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co." the district court submitted to
the jury the question of whether a contract, combination or conspiracy
existed and the plaintiff was awarded treble damages. The court of ap-
peals reversed on the ground that Colgate required a directed verdict for
defendant unless an express contract to fix prices could be shown. The
Supreme Court corrected this notion concerning Colgate:
Apparently the former case [Colgate] was misapprehended. The latter
opinion [Schradersl distinctly stated that the essential agreement, com-
bination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing or
other circumstances. 12
So the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that a jury could infer
that the requisite contract, combination, or conspiracy existed. How-
ever, the court of appeals was affirmed on the ground that the trial judge
had given an erroneous and prejudicial instruction to the jurors. The in-
struction stated that if it was found that the manufacturer had announced
and frequently reminded his jobbers of his pricing policy and if the great
majority of the jobbers had not only expressed no dissent, but had actually
cooperated by selling at the named price, an agreement or combination
could be implied. The Court rejected this instruction as being erroneous
because no agreement or combination could be inferred from such be-
havior. This places a rather tight outer boundary upon the implied con-
tract theory.
One of the most important cases to consider, and curtail, the Colgate
doctrine is F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.'3 The action was brought
by the F.T.C., and it sought to have the "Beech-Nut Policy" enjoined as
an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The Beech-Nut Policy was a price-maintenance pro-
gram nearly identical to Colgate's. The Supreme Court enjoined the
Company:
[F]rom carrying into effect its so-called Beech-Nut Policy by cooperative
methods in which the respondent and its distributors, customers and
10 Id. at 99.
1256 U.S. 208 (1920).
12 d. at 210.
13 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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agents undertake to prevent others from obtaining the company's products
at less than the prices designated by it .... 14
Beech-Nut differed from Colgate in two significant ways and the prob-
lem was to decide which of these two factors was the most significant in
bringing about the opposite result in the cases. Beech-Nut was an ac-
tion under Section 5, and, unlike the Sherman Act, Section 5 does not re-
quire a contract, combination or conspiracy. Probably most important,
though, is the fact that the Beech-Nut complaint, unlike Colgate, alleged
sufficient facts to show a contract.
In U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co."; Soft-Lite was the exclusive
buyer of tinted lenses which Bausch produced. Soft-Lite adopted a dis-
tribution policy of selling only to those wholesalers who would deal
exclusively in the Soft-Lite line and who would cooperate in maintaining
the Company's price policy. The wholesalers were to sell only to author-
ized Tetailers. If Soft-Lite discovered that a dealer was not following the
published price list the dealer's name would be put on a black-list and the
wholesalers would cut off his supply. The Court's language in holding
that an illegal combination existed is important, for the Court expressly
declared that even though no agreement is shown the combination can
be found:
Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement
or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in effec-
tuating its purpose is immaterial.'( [Emphasis Added]
The Court's language discredited, if not overruled, the Frey case. A man-
ufacturer's announcement of a policy, followed by compliance upon the
part of his dealers, may indeed be sufficient to show an implied conspir-
acy.1
7
The cases discussed to this point have dealt with refusals to deal to
maintain minimum prices or a monopoly.' 8 However, it may be illegal to
conspire to maintain maximum prices,19 just as it may be unlawful to re-
14 Id. at 455-6.
15 321 U.S. 707 (1943).
16 Id. at 723.
17 Cf., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274-5 (1941); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-7 (1938). For a discussion of conscious parallel conduct
and refusals to deal, see, Turner, supra, note 5.
18 Colgate itself placed one clear limit on the right to refuse to deal, and that is when the re-
fusal is part and parcel of an attempt to monopolize. In Lorain Journal v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951) the publisher of the town's only newspaper attempted to maintain its monopoly
position in news distribution by refusing to accept advertising from businesses that also advertised
with a newly formed radio station. The Court easily found a violation of Section 2 of Sherman.
See, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). Compare, Times-Picayune Publ. Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952).
19 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1950). A more recent
example of this is Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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fuse to deal as a means of enforcing a tying arrangement.2 The Attor-
ney General's Report of 1955 summarized the pre-Parke, Davis law in
this fashion:
In conclusion, the decisions have placed and evaluated refusals
to deal in the business setting in which they appear. While refusals to
deal in themselves are legally protected, they are examined in their market
context in light of the broader policies of which they are part.
The Committee approves this discerning market analysis of refusals
to deal as essential to reconciling the preservation of legitimate individ-
ual business discretion with the protection of free enterprise from monop-
olistic practices and restraints of trade.
The Committee recommends no revision of the Sherman, Clayton, or
Federal Trade Commission Acts designed to modify their impact on the
anti-trust validity of refusals to deal.1
The Report, in this writer's opinion, gives support to an illogical system
that considers form over substance. The Court before and after Parke, Da-
vis has steadfastly refused to overrule Colgate. It has become increasing-
ly difficult to establish that the refusal to deal was unilateral, but where
it can be established - and notwithstanding the Supreme Court this is
frequently accomplished in the lower courts - the refusal is protected
from a Section 1 charge. If the premise that price-fixing is per se bad is
accepted, then it only makes sense to condemn it no matter how it is
achieved. The refusal to deal is viewed in its business context, as the Re-
port notes, but an unwarranted limitation is placed upon this review by
Colgate.
Unfortunately Parke, Davis, which is the end of Round Two, did
little to improve the Colgate dilemma. The Court acknowledged this
fact when it observed:
The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress competition.
True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a pro-
hibited combination to suppress price competition if each customer, al-
though induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, inde-
pendently decides to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is
not overruled, this result is tolerated .... 22
Parke, Davis attempted to control the retail prices of its products by an-
nouncing its prices to all of the retailers concerned and informing them
that price-cutters would be cancelled. If a retailer failed to observe the
suggested price, he was put on a black-list and Parke, Davis informed its
wholesalers that they too would be cut-off if they made any more sales
to that retailer. A crucial fact in the case was that Parke, Davis obtained
2O0 Tiraes-Picayune PubL Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594 (1952) (Although no conspiracy was
found here).
21 AT'Y GEN. NATL. Com. A-NM USr REP. 136-7 (1955).
22362 U.S. at 44.
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assurances from each retailer that he would observe the schedule, and
then communicated this fact to every other retailer to induce their co-
operation. The Court found this to be fatal:
It was only by actively bringing about substantial unanimity among the
competitors that Park Davis was able to gain adherence to its policy. It
must be admitted that a seller's announcement that he will not deal with
customers who do not observe his policy may tend to engender confi-
dence in each customer that if he complies his competitors will also.
But if a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to
bring about general voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral ef-
fect of eliminating price competition, and takes affirmative action to
achieve uniform adherence by inducing each customer to adhere to avoid
such price competition, the customer's acquiescence is not then a matter of
individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the product.
... The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance com-
bination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.23
The Court also found a second combination or conspiracy - this one was
between Parke, Davis and the wholesalers who cooperated by refusing to
sell to black-listed retailers.
The Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb decisions were cited with approv-
al and the Court re-affirmed the proposition that no contract, either ex-
press or implied, need be proven to establish a violation of Section 1.
Conduct evidencing a combination is sufficient. The weak spot in Parke,
Davis is the dictum, quoted above, to the effect that a mere announce-
ment of policy followed by a truly unilateral refusal to deal does not
violate the Act. The Court incorrectly assumed that once such an an-
nouncement is made, the dealers are free to comply or not to comply, and
that whatever path they follow their decision is voluntary. The fact is
that once a powerful company announces that it will not supply price
cutters, some dealers will be coerced into compliance.
IV. ROUND THREE
Round Three has not been completed, but enough of it has unfolded
to forecast Colgate's demise. The case does not need to be overturned,
but it must and will be limited in application to those situations where
the refusal to deal will not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
A study of several post-Parke, Davis Supreme Court and lower court
opinions reveals the theory that will be used to finish Colgate.24
23 1d. at 46-7.
24 A few of the post-Park, Davis refusal cases that are not considered in this article are, Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Cham-
pion Spark Plug Co., 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966); Geo. W. Warner & Co., Inc. v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., Inc., 277 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1960); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Co. v. Union As-
bestos Co., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 784 (S. D. N. Y. 1963).
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The defendant company in Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop25
distributed price lists for its products and announced that it expected
retailers to observe them. Defendant's employees then visited the var-
ious retail outlets and attempted to purchase for less than the suggested
price. Any price-cutting retailer was informed that he would be cut off
unless he conformed immediately. If the dealer conformed, he was not
terminated. Plaintiff did not conform so 'his supply was cut off. The
district court found no contract, combination or conspiracy and there-
fore, no violation:
[I]n order to be entitled to relief under the Sherman Act, plaintiff need
not allege or prove either an express or implied agreement to fix prices.
However, it is essential that he allege facts from which a combination
for this purpose can be found; for the manufacturer's unilateral act in
refusing to sell to a dealer who will not observe suggested retail prices,
is not a violation of the Sherman Act.26
It would appear that this case was wrongly decided even under the con-
servative Parke, Davis standards. Plaintiff alleged an implied contract
by his contention that defendant approached price-cutters and gave them
one last chance to conform. If a price-cutter conformed after this -
and plaintiff alleged that some did - an agreement should be found.
The case of Osborn v. Sinclair Refining CoY supports this interpreta-
tion of Parke, Davis. Plaintiff was cut-off by Sinclair for not exclusively
selling Goodyear TBA (tires, batteries & accessories), but when he agreed
to sell only Goodyear products he was reinstated as a dealer. Again plain-
tiff violated the exclusive buying arrangement and again he lost his lease.
The court of appeals found that this second refusal to deal was illegal.
If a supplier chooses to cut-off a customer, he must do so without asking
him to conform, and once the customer has been cut-off he cannot be safely
reinstated.
Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc2 8 is an interesting attempt by
a district court to bury both Colgate and the dictum of Parke, Davis. Un-
fortunately the court of appeals was not favorably disposed to such action
and it reversed."9 The district court found that plaintiff was the owner
of two retail stores that discounted defendant's products. This was vio-
lative of defendant's price maintenance policy. Defendant issued cata-
logues of suggested resale prices and each item was pre-ticketed with the
price. New retailers were informed that the company expected them to
sell at the suggested prices. If the retailer expressed his intention to dis-
count, he would not receive any of defendant's products. Plaintiff was
2r 194 F. Supp. 83 (S. D. Cal. 1961).
261d. at 86-7.
27286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
28206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962).
9 323 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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warned several times that if he continued to discount he would be cut-off.
Upon receiving complaints from two of plaintiff's competitors who did
not sell at discount prices, defendant finally terminated plaintiff's sup-
ply. The court of appeals held that the evidence did not support any of
the district's court's findings with regard to the existence of a contract,
combination or conspiracy. It found that the evidence only showed the
existence of conscious parallel conduct, which, standing alone, does not
violate the Sherman Act. This is not -the place to quibble over which
court read the evidence correctly, but it is -interesting to contrast the dif-
ferent attitude of the two courts on the issue of conscious parallelism.
iIn, c4nsidering the A Pae,7 Davis dictim the district court stated:
"the conceifiai difficulty which inheres in this seemingly forthright
line drawing process is the element of agreement which attends a sel-
ler's adherence to a manufacturer's schedule of resale prices. In the face
of an advance announcement by the manufacturer that price cutters will
be denied supply, a seller's compliance with prices suggested strongly
infers a tacit or implied resale price maintenance agreement.
From a practical point of view, assuming lawful resort to the sanction
of refusal to deal and consequent collective adherence by dealers to the
prices specified, the resulting economic restraint is functionally indistin-
guishable from the anticompetitive situation which arises from a purely
horizontal price fLxing conspiracy among retailers8 0
...[TJhe record plainly reveals that Wanamaker and Strawbridge
[competitors of plaintiff] complied with the prices established with knowl-
edge that the American scheme required concerted retailer adherence for its
effectiveness, thereby rendering these two retailers parties to the resultant
unlawful conspiracy under the principles of Masonite and Interstate Cir-
cuit.81
The court recognized that Colgate, as interpreted by Parke, Davis, per-
mitted the mere announcement in advance of the company's policy, fol-
lowed by a simple refusal to deal. It went on to render this limited right
meaningless by stating that if dealers are aware of the supplier's overall
marketing policy and if they conform to that policy in order to make it
effective, a conspiracy is formed. This the court of appeals did not buy.
The case of Lessig v. Tidewater. Oil Co.2 involved both price mainte-
nance and tying. Plaintiff contended that his service station lease was
terminated because he refused to cooperate with defendant in either pro-
gram. The court of appeals found that the facts showed the existence of
a price fixing conspiracy between Tidewater and its dealers. But more
important is what the court had to say about an instruction given by the
trial court concerning the tying arrangement:
80206 F. Supp. at 937-8.
31 Id. at 942.
82327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
[Vol. 30
COMMENTS
The jury was instructed that Tidewater could "urge and encourage" its
dealers to buy "all their TBA" from Tidewater, and "express disappoint-
ment" if it found they were buying from others. We think the instruc-
tion went too far. If the evidence established that Tidewater followed
the course of conduct described and that Tidewater's dealers thereafter
purchased from it their requirements of sponsored TBA items, an inference
of tacit agreement would be virtually compelled.33
Thus the court held that although a supplier might be able to announce
his policy in advance and cut-off those who breach it, he cannot express
disapproval if the dealers do not comply. Note that the trial court did
not say that the supplier could threaten to cut-off a non-complying dealer,
it merely instructed the jury that the supplier could "express disappoint-
ment." This instruction "went too far."
In 1964 Simpson v. Union Oil Co"4 was decided by the Supreme Court.
Gas was sold by Union to Simpson under a consignment contract which
required Simpson to observe the prices fixed by Union. Simpson cut
prices so his lease was not renewed. The court found that an agreement,
even though coerced, existed between Simpson and Union and thus the
subsequent refusal to deal was unlawful:
We made dear in [Parke, Davis] that a supplier may not use coercion
on its retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance. We reiterate that
view, adding that it matters not what the coercive device is.35
The case is a further encroachment upon Colgate because it held (i) an
agreement between the supplier and his customer alone is sufficient up-
on which to base a violation of Section 1, (2) the customer is not barred
by the defense of in pari delicto in asserting his cause 86 and (3) the
"agreement" need not be an agreement at all, rather it may be coerced
"compliance." The dealer did not even impliedly agree to sell at the
supplier's prices, he was forced to do so.
Broussard v. Socony Mobile Oil Co.37 and Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co.,38
both decided in the court of appeals, cast more doubt upon the Parke, Da-
vis dictum that a supplier may announce his policy to refuse to deal with
price-cutters. In Broussard the court upheld plaintiff's cause of action
for defendant's refusal to deal (cancelled lease) when plaintiff alleged
that he was threatened with termination if he did not raise his prices. He
complied for awhile after the threat and then reduced the price again, at
33 Id. at 473.
34 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
35Id. at 17.
36 The term "it Pari delicto" is used rather loosely and in its broadest sense at this point for
simplidty. For a more accurate analysis of this and related doctrines, see, Note, 30 Oio ST. L
J. 332 (1969).
87 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
38 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
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which time he was cut-off. The court found that his short-lived com-
pliance created the necessary agreement.
In Quinn 'the facts were the same except that plaintiff never complied
with defendant's demands, nor did he allege that any other dealer did so.
The court dismissed. It is interesting to note, however, what the court
believed would have been sufficient to establish a cause of action:
In Broussard there was clear evidence that the supplier's insistence that
the retail price be reduced was part of a "marketing program" .....
The allegation that defendant terminated the lease, despite the fact
that plaintiff's business had increased substantially, perhaps comes dose to
raising an inference that defendant was policing a general scheme to fix
prices for the area. But this court should not be required to so specu-
late. Nor is it too much to require this plaintiff, absent the showing of
an agreement, to allege . . . that the acts took place within the larger
framework of a pricing program, policy or conspiracy .... 39 [Empha-
sis Added]
The court apparently is stating that if plaintiff's lease were cancelled in
order to help enforce a general program of price fLing, a cause of action
would lie against the supplier.
The Supreme Court in United States v. General Motors Corp.40 caused
further concern for Colgate worshippers when it stated:
On the contrary, overriding corporate policy with respect to proper dealer
relations dissuaded General Motors from engaging in this sort of wholly
unilateral conduct, the validity of which under the antitrust laws was
assumed, without being decided in Parke Davis.. 41 [Emphasis
Added].
At the outset of this article, the writer indicated that the Colgate doc-
trine received a severe blow in 1968 from two Supreme Court decisions
- Albrecht and Texaco.4 2 The Round Three cases which have already
been considered plus Albrecht and Texaco clearly indicate that new law
is in the making. A supplier who has sufficient economic power to en-
force his price policy as to some of his dealers will no longer be able to
announce in advance his policy to refuse to deal with price cutters. If he
does, some of his dealers will be coerced into observing his price sugges-
tions. This will create the necessary combination, and any subsequent
refusal to deal for the purpose of enforcing the price policy will be unlaw-
ful. One might go further and conclude that the mere termination of
dealers who do not observe "prevailing market prices," without an ad-
vance announcement of such a policy, will be a violation. If enough
price-deviants are terminated, at some point in time a marketing policy
39 Id. at 276.
40384 U.S. 127 (1966).
41 Id. at 143-4.
4 2 See, notes 2 and 3 supra, and accompanying text.
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will become dear to the other dealers. They will become aware that the
supplier is cutting-off anyone who deviates from his suggested price or
from the prevailing market price. If the supplier has sufficient economic
power, some of these dealers will be coerced into observing the correct
price. If this occurs, a combination is formed, and any subsequent refusal
to deal to enforce the price policy will be unlawful. Colgate will only
have validity in those cases where (1) the refusal to deal was not for the
purpose of enforcing some anticompetitive policy or (2) the supplier
does not have sufficient power over the dealers to enforce his anticompe-
titive policy. In other words, Colgate will be limited to those cases
where it is unnecessary. Now to support this thesis with further cases.
In Albrecht plaintiff was an independent distributor of defendant's
newspapers, having purchased a home delivery route. Plaintiff was charg-
ing a higher price for the papers than defendant desired, so defendant
hired a newspaper circulation company to solicit plaintiff's customers from
him. The company successfully solicited 300 of plaintiff's 1200 customers
and these were given by defendant to another independent distributor, with
the understanding that they would be returned to plaintiff if and when he
conformed to the pricing policy. The court found a conspiracy to fix
prices between the circulation company, the independent distributor and de-
fendant. But the language of the Court is important. In characterizing
Parke, Davis it said:
The combination with retailers [in Parke, Davis] arose because their ac-
quiescence in the suggested prices was secured by threats of termina-
tion.... 4 3
The fact is, Parke, Davis found that a combination was entered into by
the retailers and Parke, Davis because each was solicited and informed
that his competitors had agreed to maintain prices. The Parke, Davis
Court expressly stated that Colgate permitted a seller to threaten cancel-
lation. The fatal error by Parke, Davis was that it obtained assurances
of compliance from each retailer and then communicated these assurances
to every other dealer. The dealers did not comply solely in order to avoid
termination, but rather because their competitors had agreed to comply.
It must be assumed that the Albrecht Court's construction of Parke,
Davis was not accidental. The Court is stating that coercion by threat
of termination is sufficient to create a combination if the dealers acqui-
esce. Further, the Court stated that under the Parke, Davis rule:
petitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and him-
self, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's
advertised price. Likewise, he might have successfully claimed that re-
spondent had combined with other carriers because the firmly enforced
43 390 U.S. at 149.
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price policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it.44
[Emphasis Added].
From this it can be reasoned that the only price maintenance policy that
is legal is one which is not or cannot be enforced. For if the policy is
enforced, say by refusals to deal, some dealers will soon be coerced into
acquiescence. A subsequent refusal to deal will 'be a result of the unlaw-
ful combination to maintain prices.
Note should be made of how far the Court has traversed since Col-
gate. In Colgate the Court assumed that no combination could be found
without first proving that some agreement had been entered. Today a
combination can be established by proving that the supplier and his
dealer openly disagreed, such as when the dealer must be coerced into
obeying the pricing policy.
The Texaco case involved a sales commission plan between Texaco
and Goodrich covering TBA products. The plan involved the sale of TBA
to Texaco dealers by Goodrich, with Texaco receiving a commission on
all sales made to its dealers. Texaco frequently reminded its dealers that
it desired them to buy Goodrich TBA, but no overt coercion was exercised.
The Court found a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. The dealers were coerced into accepting the Goodrich TBA by
the immense power that Texaco held over them, notwithstanding the lack
of overt threats:
A service station dealer whose very livelihood depends upon the contin-
uing good favor of a major oil company is constantly aware of the oil
company's desire that he stock and sell the recommended brand of TBA
•... With the dealer's supply of gasoline, his lease on his station, and
the Texaco indentification subject to continuing review, we think it
flies in the face of common sense to say, as Texaco asserts, that the dealer
is "perfectly free" to reject Texaco's chosen brand of TBA.4
Although Texaco involved a charge under Section 5 of the FTC Act and
therefore no contract, combination or conspiracy had to be shown, the
Court's reasoning applies equally well to the refusal to deal situation
under Section 1 of Sherman. The mere announcement of suggested
prices by Texaco will coerce some dealers into compliance and thus an
unlawful combination will be formed. If Texaco later were to cut-off a
dealer who did not follow the prices, the refusal to deal would violate
Section 1 of Sherman. Even if Texaco did not announce suggested prices,
but rather it merely began to cut-off dealers who deviated from the pre-
vailing market price, a combination could be found at some point in time
- when the other dealers recognized the marketing policy behind all of
441d. at 150, note 6.
45 393 U.S. at 229.
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the terminations. Subsequent refusals to deal to enforce stable prices
would be illegal.
The Texaco situation is a relatively easy case to decide under this
theory. There will be many occasions when it will be difficult -to deter-
mine if the requisite coercive power is present. Texaco owned the leases
of over 40 percent of its dealers, the term of the lease was short (one-
year), the contract to supply the dealers' products could be cancelled upon
30 days notice, and the dealers were small businessmen with a large per-
centage of their meager capital tied up in the station, while Texaco was a
giant. All of these factors and others created enormous coercive power in
Texaco. If the product is patented or trade-marked and if there are no
close substitutes, the supplier's power is enhanced. The diversity of the
buyer is important - i.e., does the supplier's product(s) constitute a large
percentage of the buyer's sales? Are the prices uniform among the deal-
ers? If so, this is evidence of coercive power.
It should be noted that the question of whether the seller has coercive
power does not require power over each and every dealer. It is sufficient
to show a combination if the plaintiff can prove that the seller has
coercive power over one dealer if that dealer is actually coerced into the
combination. However only unreasonable restraints of trade are con-
demned by the Sherman Act, so a plaintiff will probably have to show that
many dealers were actually coerced in order to establish a violation of
Section 1.
One more problem must be resolved. If the service station dealers
are coerced by Texaco into observing uniform prices and if plaintiff's
lease is terminated because of his refusal to conform, does the plaintiff
have a cause of action against the dealers who formed part of the combina-
tion? To be logically consistent it would seem that the answer should be
"yes", although as a matter of policy this would be a harsh result. If it
had not been for the acquiescence by the other dealers, plaintiff's lease
would not have been terminated - Texaco would have been forced to
back down. On the other hand, these dealers were unwilling conspirators
who had no effective alternative.
The answer to this dilemma lies in Perma Life Aufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp.46 That case holds that when a dealer is coerced into
an unlawful contract by his supplier, he has a cause of action against the
supplier to recover any losses that he suffered under the contract. If,
then, a dealer who is cut-off by Texaco should decide to bring suit against
his fellow dealers, the defendant dealers will be able to shift this entire
loss back to the supplier, Texaco.
46 392 U.S. 134 (1968). This case is considered in Note, 30 Omo ST. L. J. 322 (Spring
1969).
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V. CONCLUSION
Almost from the moment of its birth, Colgate has been engaged in a
fierce struggle for survival. Today it appears that the battle is nearly
completed. Such opponents as Schrader's, Beech-Nut, Bausch and Parke,
Davis have weakened the doctrine, and some as yet unknown opponent,
following theories of Texaco and Albrecht, will finish it. A manufac-
turer or supplier who has the economic power to enforce an anticompet-
ive policy will no longer be able to unilaterally refuse to deal for that
purpose. If the policy would be illegal if the supplier had overtly con-
spired with others to enforce it, then he will not be permitted to use the
refusal to deal to enforce the policy.
In order to find a violation using the theory outlined in this article,
a court would have to decide (1) that there was a unilateral refusal to
deal, (2) that the refusal was to enforce an illegal policy, (3) that the
supplier had sufficient economic power to coerce at least one of his
dealers into acquiescence and acceptance of the policy, (4) that some
dealer was in fact coerced immediately before the refusal occurred, and
(5) that an unreasonable restraint of trade has occurred.
William M. Isaac
